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1. Introduction 
The structure of competitive markets is quite robust with respect to the level of expertise of 
the participants. The nature of play in these markets is quite different from oligopolistic 
markets where firms are not price takers and need to understand (at least at the intuitive 
level) the nature of strategic interaction between rivals. Besides a valid robustness check, 
the role of experience in understanding the nature of play in these markets may thus be 
important
2. 
  Based upon these ideas we conduct experiments where each subject participates 
twice in a quantity setting market. Following standard convention we call first time 
participants as inexperienced and second time participants as experienced subjects. All 
experiments were run with symmetric and asymmetric cost oligopolies. We find that 
experience can indeed be an important factor in quantity setting oligopolies. The role of 
experience varies depending upon the market and cost structures. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, in line with results reported in the 
literature, inexperienced subjects in symmetric cost environments play around the non-
cooperative Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Observed quantities are slightly above the 
theoretical prediction for duopolies and a little higher for quadropolies. 
Second, we observe the well known result that an increase in the number of firms 
makes the market more competitive. Both inexperienced and experienced quadropolies 
produce output above the Nash prediction. 
Third, and in contrast to the behavior of inexperienced subjects, experienced 
duopolies choose and output notably smaller than the Nash-Cournot prediction. In fact, in 
three out of four symmetric duopoly experiments subjects choose output on the collusive 
side, with one of them approaching remarkably close to the monopolistic output. 
Experienced quadropolies still produce slightly more than the equilibrium prediction, but 
less than the inexperienced counterparts. 
                                                 
2 Nagel and Vriend (1999) study the role of experience in a variation of the quantity choosing game. The price 
of the commodity is fixed for all periods and firms send costly information signals to attract buyers. They find 
that experience does not matter in this setting.   3
Fourth, we find that asymmetric cost duopolies are more competitive than their 
symmetric counterparts
3. However, there are important differences in output selection 
between the low and high cost firms. In all cases (inexperienced and experienced, duopoly 
and quadropoly) low cost firms tend to produce around the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
The high cost firms, on the other hand, produce more than their respective Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium quantities. Deviation from the equilibrium is higher for high cost firms and is 
higher for quadropolies than for duopolies. Further, compared with experienced players, the 
deviation from equilibrium is greater for inexperienced subjects. 
Fifth, an analysis of individual data tells us that experienced subjects tacitly collude 
more than inexperienced ones. Given the negative slope of the reaction function, we know 
that the best responses for individual subjects must be negatively correlated with respect to 
the rivals’ chosen quantity. However, we find that the output choices for experienced 
duopolies are positively correlated. Even though experienced quadropolies tend to be 
relatively more competitive, we find that the correlation coefficient for them is positive in 
most cases. This result is surprising and indicates that subjects clearly attempt to change 
output in the same direction, thus suggesting attempts at tacit collusion. Another interesting 
result from the individual analysis is that greater support is found for Cournot conjectures 
under asymmetric costs. This is true for inexperienced and experienced subjects. 
Finally, we run individual regressions where individual play is explored by 
estimating some decision rules. Our results do not support the best response dynamics. In 
fact a large number of the subjects adjust output in correlation with rival outputs. This may 
be indicating attempts to collude. Surprisingly, we obtain the same result also for 
experienced duopolies. This proportion, however, drops for quadropolies indicating that 
collusion becomes difficult with a large number of firms. 
The results we present for the asymmetric cost experiments are along the lines of 
the results presented in Mason et al. (1992) for inexperienced subjects. Our results, 
however, differ from theirs for experienced subjects. We find that experienced asymmetric 
duopolies are relatively more competitive than their inexperienced counterparts. Though, 
                                                 
3 This result is also reported for inexperienced subjects in Mason et al. (1992).   4
not a direct test of his theory, the findings in our paper can be better interpreted given the 
predictions in Vasconcelos (2005). He analyzes the incentives to collude for quantity 
setting oligopolies in a repeated game framework. He shows that the incentives to collude 
are decreasing in the degree of asymmetry. Further, smaller (less efficient) firms have a 
greater incentive to deviate from possible collusive outcomes. It is interesting to note that 
we observe similar results in a random-matching framework. 
Our paper adds to an already wide body of literature on quantity setting 
oligopolies
4. The broad results from the quantity experiments are the following. Obtaining 
successful collusion
5 in experimental quantity setting oligopolies is difficult, and the non-
cooperative Nash-Cournot equilibrium is a good predictor of the quantity choices under 
random matching (Holt, 1985; Huck et al., 2001; and Huck et al., 2004). Successful 
collusion only sometimes emerges with duopolies under fixed matching while quadropolies 
result in outcomes that are much more competitive than predicted. Further, outcomes under 
asymmetric costs outcomes are relatively more competitive (Mason et al., 1992). Our 
results add to the existing literature in that we show that subject experience is indeed 
important, and that it influences the outcome differently, depending on the quantity of firms 
and the asymmetry of the costs. Further, we conduct analysis of individual data shows that 
experienced subjects attempt to collude both under symmetric and asymmetric costs under 
both duopolies and quadropolies. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the experimental design. 
Section 3 presents the results detailed by market, while Section 4 analyzes individual 
behavior. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The experimental design 
A total of 278 students participated in 63 duopoly and 38 quadropoly experiments at 
George Mason and Chapman universities. Subjects were told that they had to commit for 
                                                 
4 See meta survey is Huck, Normann and Oechssler, 2004. 
5 The effect of changing information on collusion is found in Fouraker and Siegel (1963) and Huck et al. 
(1999 and 2000).   5
two series of experiments and were paid $20 upon showing up for the second experiment
6. 
The experiments lasted around 2 hours for inexperienced and 90 minutes for experienced 
subjects. Out of the 16 duopoly and 10 quadropoly (inexperienced) experiments subjects 
were then used for 15 duopoly and 9 quadropoly experiments at George Mason University. 
At Chapman University, out of the 16 duopoly and 10 quadropoly experiments subjects 
then came back for 16 duopoly and 9 quadropoly experiments
7. Subjects were provided 
computerized interactive instructions
8. 
All experiments were conducted for 2 and 4 firms with symmetric and asymmetric 
costs. Three different treatments were run with inexperienced subjects for both duopolies 
and quadropolies. The experiments were then repeated with once experienced subjects. In 
the first series of experiments the upper production cap was kept at the monopoly level of 
output and slightly above the monopoly level for the asymmetric cost case (with the lower 
cap at zero)
9. As monopoly output is different for the high and low cost firms we set the 
production cap slightly above the monopoly outcome for the asymmetric cost experiments 
(see Table 1 for details).
10 
In all experiments, except one, we use the linear demand  Q A P − = . Demand and 
seller costs were adjusted so that  90 = −c A . For the symmetric cost cases, the individual 
quantities in the Nash-Cournot equilibrium are  30
) 2 ( =
= n q  and  18
) 4 ( =
= n q  for the duopoly 
and quadropoly, respectively, which give total market quantities of  60
) 2 ( =
= n Q  and 
72
) 4 ( =
= n Q . The competitive and monopoly and levels of total market outputs are 
90 =
comp Q  and  45 =
monop Q , respectively. In one series of experiments the slope was 
changed to 0.83. To facilitate comparisons, most results are presented as proportions with 
respect to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium or to the competitive quantities. 
                                                 
6 A large show up fees may have wealth effects on subject behavior. Note that our show up fees ($20) was 
only $6 more than the show up fees for two subsequent experiments (i.e. $14). We would like to thank Han-
Theo for making this point. 
7 The decrease in the number of experiments with experienced subjects is due to no shows. 
8 Instructions can be seen in the Appendix. 
9 This was done to check the robustness of the results. Note that production caps have not been consistently 
set in the literature  
10 We study the role of production caps in detail in a companion paper.   6
For the asymmetric cost experiments parameters A and c were set such that 
90 = −c A  for the high cost firm, and 95 for low cost firm. The Nash-Cournot individual 
equilibrium quantities are 28.33 and 33.33, respectively. The various equilibrium outcomes 
for 2 and 4 sellers are listed in Table 2. 
Table 1 
  Number of experiments 
Production caps 
Inexperienced 
Symmetric  Duo/Quad Duopoly  Quadropoly 
Set 1  5/5  {0,45}  {0,45} 
Set 2  6/5 {0,90} {0,90}
Set 3  4/-  {7,45}  - 
Set 4  7/5 {0,45} {0,45}
Asymmetric     
Set 5  9/5 {0,50} {0,50}
   Experienced 
Symmetric    Duopoly Quadropoly 
Set 6  5/5  {0,45}  {0,45} 
Set 7  5/4 {0,90} {0,90}
Set 8  5*/-  {7,45}  - 
Set 9  7/4 {0,45} {0,45}
Asymmetric     
Set 10  7/5 {0,50} {0,50}
(*) The slope was changed from 1 to 0.83 in this experiment. 
(**) To obtain group size multiply number of experiments  
by 2 for duopolies and by 4 for quadropolies. 
 
Table 2 
 Competitive  Cournot  Monopoly 
Symmetric Duopoly (b=1)  90  60  45 
Symmetric Duopoly (b=.85)  90  72  54 
Asymmetric Duopoly  90  61.66  47.5 
Symmetric Quadropoly  90  72  45 
Asymmetric quadropoly  90  74  47.5 
 
3. Experimental results 
First we analyze results from pooled data for the different cases. We present the analysis for   7
the first 70 periods for all experiments
11. We then compare the results for the different 
treatments, namely duopoly vs. quadropoly, symmetric vs, asymmetric cost, and 
experienced vs. inexperienced. We leave the individual data analysis for the next section. 
                                                 
11 Subjects were told the duration of the experiment at the time of recruiting. We ran the experiments for the 
entire period promised. For data analysis we have chosen the minimum of the periods. None of our results 
change if we include the additional periods.   8
3.1 Symmetric Dupoly 
Experienced symmetric duopolies find it easier to tacitly collude on output in three out of 
four cases
12. In the three cases, output produced is closer to the monopoly level than the 
Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Tacit collusion is obtained in our experiments despite the fact 
that we have random matching, a property that facilitates one-shot equilibrium behavior. 
Our result contrasts with previous results on quantity setting markets where, with 
inexperienced subjects, duopolies seldom collude and the output produced is closer to the 
Nash-Cournot equilibrium. 
 
The results for the fourth series of experiments (at Chapman) are much more 
competitive than the first three
13. In this treatment the output produced under the 
experienced and inexperienced treatment are not statistically different (p-value = 0.23). 
However, one sees that experience does matter in this case also. Variance for inexperienced 
subjects (6.94) is more than twice the variance observed for experienced subjects (2.29). 
                                                 
12 Given the strong results in the first two series, we ran a third series of experiments where we changed 
parameters (slope (0.83) and production cap (min cap=7)) both for the inexperienced and experienced 
treatment. The results in these experiments were similar to our two series of experiment reporting tacit 
collusion. 
13 Note that these experiments were run with 7 randomly matched duopolies compared with group sizes of 5, 
6 and 4 at GMU. Group size varied at GMU due to many experiments being run at the same time combined 
with no shows. Though, not important for fixed matching, it could be the case that increasing the number of 

































Figure 1: Symmetric Duopoly-Average Output
Experienced Inexperienced  9
Figure 1 shows the average individual quantities per period for both inexperienced 
and experienced subjects. Outputs are shown as a percentage of the Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium output levels. Table 3 shows the details for the different series of experiments. 
With inexperienced subjects we obtain results along similar lines of the literature. 
Inexperienced subjects produce output slightly above the Nash-Cournot equilibrium output 
level.   10
Table 3 
Duopoly Symmetric Costs 
    Average output (% of Cournot) 
  Cournot  
(Monopoly)  All periods  First 15  Last 15 
ALL        
Inexperienced  100 
(75) 
106 104.27  104.33 
Experienced 87.44  90.56  86.43 
T1
14        
Inexp  100 
(75) 
99.43 109.30  95.40 
Exp 81.17  83.03  79.70 
T2
15        
Inexp  100 
(75) 
104.17 99.70  103.60 
Exp 77.53  80.50  76.23 
T3
16        
Inexp
  100 
(75) 
104.13 98.03  105.03 
Exp
  64.22 67.43  63.64 
T4
17        
Inexp  100 
(75) 
115.33 107.70  111.87 
Exp 114.47  117.27  113.77 
 
3.2 Asymmetric duopoly 
Asymmetric duopolies play closer to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium in both the 
inexperienced and experienced treatments. Experienced asymmetric duopolies are much 
more competitive than experienced symmetric duopolies (see tables 3 and 4). Further, 
experienced asymmetric duopolies are also more competitive than their inexperienced 
counterparts. Our results clearly point towards the competition enhancing effect of 
asymmetric costs. 
Studying firms based on their cost efficiency, we find that the high-cost firms 
produce output above the Nash prediction. The low-cost firms, meanwhile, produce output 
at, or slightly below, the equilibrium prediction, while high-cost duopolies deviate more, 
producing output greater than the equilibrium prediction (Table 5). 
 
                                                 
14 T1: Upper competitive bound. 
15 T2: Upper monopoly bound. 
16 T3: Lower bound of 10 and upper competitive bound, with slope set at 0.83. 
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Duopoly Asymmetric Costs (overall) 
  Average output (% of Cournot) 
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The results under experience change. Experienced low cost duopolies produce 
output closer to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium and are more competitive than their 
inexperienced counterparts (99.7% vs 92.8% for all periods). However, experienced high 
cost duopolies are only slightly less competitive (110.2% vs 107.45 for all periods). 
Interestingly, output for experienced high cost firms is stable across the experiment. 
3.3 Symmetric Quadropoly 
First, we confirm the well known result that an increase in the number of firms makes the 
market more competitive. Both inexperienced and experienced quadropolies produce output 
above the Nash-Cournot prediction. Experience still matters, though not as much as for a 
duopoly. Conducting a difference of means t-test reveals that output under experience is 
significantly lower ( 0 . 0 = p ) compared to average output for inexperienced subjects. 
Average output with experience is smaller than under inexperience. These results hold for 
all treatments. Our results are along the lines observed in earlier quantity setting 
experiments where increasing entry results in increased competition. This result is observed 
as subjects tend to produce above this equilibrium quantity in higher proportion than 
duopolies
19. 
                                                 
19 See Huck et al. (2004) as well as forward market experiments by Le Coq and Orzen (2006), where 
increasing the number of firms increases competition by a greater amount than the introduction of forward 
markets.   14
 
Table 6: 
Quadropoly Symmetric Costs  
    Average output (% of Cournot) 
  Cournot 
(Monopoly) All periods First 15 Last 15 
All        
Inexperienced  100 
(62.50) 
109.44 109.44  108.78 
Experienced 106.50  106.05  106 
T1        
Inexp  100 
(62.50) 
111.72 109.89  111.22 
Exp 104.22  101.22  105.39 
T2        
Inexp  100 
(62.50) 
109.89 105.61  112.39 
Exp 109.67  106.65  109.06 
T2        
Inexp  100 
(62.50) 
107.61 112.83  104.22 
Exp 104.5  106.56  101.06 
 
From Table 6 one can see that quadropolies are competitive in all the experiments. 
Inexperienced subjects are more competitive than experienced ones. Experienced subjects 
produce output closer to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium prediction. Further, the difference is 
statistically different. All quadropoly experiments were run with slightly different 
production caps to check the robustness of the results. Changing production caps does not 

















Figure 4: Symmetric Quadropoly-Average Output
Inexperienced Experienced  15
3.4 Asymmetric Quadropoly 
Results under asymmetric quadropolies are along expected lines. First recall that we have 2 
low-cost and 2 high-cost firms in a quadropoly. In this sense the degree of cost asymmetry 
is not extreme. As in the case of duopoly, the cost difference was kept at a moderate level. 
Output is slightly above the Nash-Cournot prediction, with a higher quantity 
produced by the inexperienced subjects. The relative deviation from the equilibrium is also 
higher than in the asymmetric duopoly case (see tables 5 and 7) but not very different from 
the symmetric quadropoly (see Table 6). It seems that the role of asymmetry is diminished 
with four firms. This could be due to the fact that the degree of competition, because of the 
larger number of firms, is already high and outweighs the effects of the introduction of cost 
asymmetry. 
As under duopolies, we find that high-cost firms are more competitive, producing 
output above the Nash-Cournot equilibrium prediction. For the low-cost firms, on the other 
hand, the average output is much closer to the equilibrium prediction (Table 8 and figures 5 
and 6). A test for difference of means tells us that the observations under low and high cost 
experienced subjects data are statistically different from the inexperienced low and high 







                                                 
20  01 . 0 = p  for the duopoly HC experienced vs. HC inexperienced pair. 
Table 7:  
Quadropoly Asymmetric Costs (overall) 
  Average output (% of Cournot)
  All Periods First 15 Last 15
Inexperienced 108.4 107.9  110.2 











































y in the qu
In fact, qu
% for inex
























































s is that eve


























perienced   17
firms meanwhile deviate much less from the non-cooperative prediction. It seems that the 
introduction of asymmetry does not matter when the number of firms is large enough. 
Further note that, in the early periods, and relative to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium, 
the high cost firm produces output that is a higher proportion of the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. However, the output trend converges for both the low and high cost firms 
towards the end of the experiment. In the last 15 periods the proportion of output for low 
and high cost firm is 111.9% and 110%, respectively.  
The results under experience are similar in the sense that the output in the initial 15 
periods is greater than the output in the last 15 periods. Though the output trend is 
decreasing, both the low and high cost firm produce output that is smaller than without 
experience. This is especially true for a duopoly that decreases its output from 111.9% 
(inexperienced-last 15 periods) to 100.4% with experience. Similar numbers are obtained 
for the high cost firm, although its output is marginally greater (104.9%) than the non-
cooperative equilibrium in the last 15 periods. Our results tell us quadropolies can reduce 
average output even under asymmetric costs. This is true while evaluating the change in 
output within periods experienced subjects. 
Comparing experienced asymmetric duopolies and quadropolies one sees that 
experienced low cost firms in both cases play at the Nash-Cournot equilibrium (99.4%). 
Interestingly, high cost firms in produce output above the Nash-Cournot equilibrium. These 
firms are not substantially more competitive in a quadropoly than in the duopoly. It is 
striking how close the results are for the two market structures when subjects are 




















































ned with   19
4. Subject experience and individual play 
In this section we study the effect of play on subject experience. First, we study best 
response play for duopolies by calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient on the outputs 
chosen in each period. The Pearson correlation coefficient is a measure of linear 
dependence between two variables. We use the Pearson correlation coeffcient for the same 
period due to our random matching design. Subjects are randomly matched in each period 
and hence they should not form conjectures on rival play from the last period. It thus seems 
reasonable that subjects make conjectures on the play of the rival for the same period and 
best-respond to it. In this sense subjects play according to the one shot framework. 
We pool all individual output choices across all experiments (Figures 7 and 8 below 
show these choices for the duopolies) with the reaction functions for the two firms. We then 
calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient between two players. Given that Cournot 
reaction functions suggest own output being negatively correlated with others’ output, one 
would expect the correlation coefficient to be negative. Though small and not significantly 
different from zero, the Pearson correlation coefficient is indeed negative for inexperienced 
duopolies (Table 9). This tells us that the direction of output changes of the best responses 
moves in the expected direction. We do not find strong evidence in favor of best-response 
play for inexperienced subjects. 
Again pooling data from all experiments, the results for experienced duopolies go in 
the opposite direction, with the Pearson correlation coefficient being positive. A t-test 
comparision tells us that the coefficient is statistically different from zero. This tells us that 
the strategic substitutability relation does not hold, and instead output choice corresponds to 
strategic complementarity for experienced subjects. This is important as it tells us that 
experienced duopolies do not play according to the best-response model and their behavior 
may be interpreted as tacit collusion on the part of subjects
21. 
                                                 
21 Note that, looking at the Chapman data individually we find that the Pearson Correlation coefficient is 
positive and significant for both experienced and inexperienced subjects.   20
Table 9: 
Symmetric Duopoly-Pearson Correlation Coefficient
Own vs others’ quantity 
 Pearson  Correlation  t-test 
Inexperience -0.002 0.852 
Experience 0.577  0.0041
 
A scatter plot for asymmetric duopolies is similar to the symmetric case. The results 
for asymmetric duopolies also go in the same direction. The Pearson correlation coefficient 
for inexperienced subjects is again negative, but not significantly different from zero (Table 
10),  thus telling us that subjects do not exactly play as is posited by the Cournot reaction 
functions. The value of the coefficient for experienced subjects, however, is positive and 
the coefficent is statistically different from zero. 
Table 10: 
Asymmetric Duopoly-Pearson Correlation Coefficient
Own vs others’ quantity 
 Pearson  correlation  t-test (p value)
Inexperience -0.183  0.517 
Experience 0.013  0.00 
 













































Best Response  21
Figure-8: Asymmetric Duopoly-Best response 
   
 
An analysis of the data for symmetric quadropolies goes along similar lines as 
obtained for symmetric duopolies. We report the Pearson correlation coefficient for own 
output against the total output produced by others in Table 11 (Tij; i indicates experiment, j 
indicates player). The sign of the Pearson correlation coefficient is negative (in 10 out of 12 
cases) for inexperienced symmetric quadropolies and the coefficents are significantly 
different from zero. This indicates that inexperienced quadropolies play according to the 
suggested best response dynamics. However, the results for experienced quadropolies are 
reversed. Ten out twelwe quadropolies have a positive Pearson correlation coefficient, with 
the correlation coefficient being significantly different from zero in all the cases. This result 
is particularly striking as we find that individual output changes is positive in response to 
output changes by everyone else despite the fact that the level of output is even higher than 
the Nash-Cournot equilibrium. Even though not successful, this suggests that subjects 












































Symmetric Quadropoly- Pearson Correlation coefficient
22 
Own vs Others’ Output 
 Inexperienced 
  T11  T12  T13 T14 T21 T22 T23 T24 
Pearson 
correlation  -0.084 -0,122 -0,153  -0,154  -0,014 -0,099 -0,066 -0,131 
t-test (p-value)  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  T31 T32 T33  T34      
Pearson 
correlation  -0,0781  0,0321  -0,07  0,020      
t-test (p-value)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      
 Experienced 
  T11  T12  T13 T14 T21 T22 T23 T24 
Pearson 
correlation  0,018 -0,096 0,003 0,03 0,077  0,171 0,06  0,13 
t-test (p-value)  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  T31  T32  T33  T34      
Pearson 
correlation  0,061 -0,127 0,036 0,069      
t-test (p-value) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00      
 
The results for asymmetric quadroplies are in line with what is suggested by earlier 
analysis. We find that the Pearson correlation coefficent for both inexperienced and 
experienced quadroplies is negative (with all coefficients being significantly different from 
zero, see Table 12). 
                                                 
22 Tij: refers to treatment i and pair j (i,j=1,2,3,4). For example, T11 refers to player 1 paired against total out 
of players 2, 3 and 4 in T1. Similarly, T12 refers to player 2 paired against total output of players 1, 3 and 4 in 
T1. Unlike in the duopoly case, where there is only one correlation –player 1 vs. player 2-, in quadropolies, 
the identity of the player is important, as there are different correlations to consider. This is also the reason to 
give coefficients separately for the different treatments.   23
Table 12: 
Asymmetric Quadropoly- Pearson Correlation coefficient
23 
(Own vs Others’ Output) 
 Inexperienced 
  T11 T12 T13 T14 
Pearson correlation  -0,031 -0,042 -0,098 -0,0197 
t-test (p-value) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Experienced 
  T11 T12 T13 T14 
Pearson correlation  -0,037 -0,146 -0,049 -0,120 
t-test (p-value) 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
4.1 Individual regressions 
In this section we study choices made by individual´s in each experiment. Individual 
behavior is explored in greater detail by estimating possible decision rules used by subjects. 
Given that we have a random matching design we assume that subjects will rely on past 
choices of their rivals, their own output, and the conjectures they make on their rivals’ 
outputs for the same period
24. Given this, we assume that the decision rule takes the form
25, 
it it i it i it i i i it e z z x t x + + + + + = − − 1 4 3 1 2 1 0 β β β β β , (1) 
where xit is own output in period t, zit is the sum of outputs in t for i’s rivals, and eit is a 
residual term. This form permits a subject’s output choice to depend on lagged own and 
rivals’ output and on twice lagged rivals’ output. Given the random matching structure it 
did not seem reasonable to include greater lags. The t term allows for a time trend. The 
residual term, eit, captures the error in estimating the true decision rule as well as random 
experimentation by subjects.  
Further, note that, in our random matching, where matches are repeated with a low 
probability and player identities are not known, the error term may also capture some form 
                                                 
23 As in Table 10, Tij: refers to treatment i and pair j (i,j=1,2,3,4). 
24 We also did some individual analysis based on own and other lags. As one would expect, other lags are not 
significant in a random matching framework. However, own lag, the period and other output for the same 
period are. 
25 The same decision rule has been estimated in Rassenti et al. (2000).   24
of global learning across the subject pool. This may further imply that the error terms are 
correlated across subjects within periods. Due to this, we estimated the equation above 
using the model of Seemingly Unrelated Equations (SURE) with first differences. The 
following equation was finally estimated, 
it it i it i it i i it u z z x x + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − − 2 4 1 3 1 2 0 β β β β , (2) 
where Δ is the first difference operator. Due to the large number of equations estimated we 
present the percentage of coefficientes significant at 5% and 1%. In tables 13 and 14 we 
present the results from the SURE regressions for duopolies and quadropolies, respectively. 
We find that the proportion of subjects with the coefficient for own putput negative and 
significant both for duopolies and quadropolies is similar (with >93% of the coefficients 
being significantly different from zero). If subjects are following an adaptive adjustment 
process it seems reasonable that they rely on own output in past period to infer about future 
outputs. Further, the negative coefficient indicates that subjects are adjusting output 
downwards as the experiments progressive. These results hold for both market structures. 
The common result, though not of the same magnitude, is that the proportion of subjects 
who adjust output in the same manner as the rivals increases with experience. This suggests 
that subjects correctly form conjectures on rival output and this ability improves with 
experience. 
  Looking at duopolies one sees that the subjects do not adjust output according to the 
best response dynamics. In fact, a larger proportion of the subjects adjust output in the same 
manner as their rivals. This indicates attempts at collusive behavior. The fact that we 
observe it for inexperienced subjects is surprising
26. This proportion goes up substantially 
for experienced subjects. One sees that the coefficient is significantly different from zero 
and positive for 52.32% of the subjects (5% confidence level). This number is substantially 
smaller for quadropolies indicating that enforcing collusion becomes difficult as the 
number of subjects increases. 
 
                                                 
26 Rassenti et al. (2000) report similar results in their experiments.   25
Table 13: Duopoly Coefficients for Individual Regressions  
% Symmetric (Asymmetric) 
Inexperienced  Negative and significant  Positive and significant 
Null  10% 5%  1% 10% 5%  1% 





(83.33)    
(5.05) 












0 4 = i β   23.35 16.84  4.34  15.19 13.02  6.51 
Experienced  10% 5%  1% 10% 5%  1% 
0 2 = i β      100 
(94.44)    
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Table 14: Quadropoly Coefficients for Individual Regressions 
% Symmetric (Asymmetric) 
Inexperienced  Negative and significant  Positive and significant 
Null 10%  5%  1%  10%  5%  1% 
0 2 = i β     96.44 
 
94.64 
(95)     
























Experienced 10%  5%  1%  10%  5%  1% 
0 2 = i β     98.03 
(95) 
94.23 
(90)     

























The coeffcient β3i tells us whether subjects best respond or not to other output (a 
negative sign corresponds to the relation between own and others’ output in the Cournot 
reaction function). One can see that both under symmetric and asymmetric costs the 
adaptive rule to adjust their output in the future periods. Note that a greater proportion of 
inexperienced subjects best respond to other output (48.88% vs 17.38%) when costs are 
asymmetric. This is, however, not maintained for experienced duopolies where we see that   26
a significantly large proportion of subjects adjust output in the same direction as the rivals. 
For example, 47.72% (94.44%) of the subjects adjust output in the same direction as rivals 
for symmetric (asymmetric) costs. We thus see that even under asymmetric costs the best 
response dynamics according to the Cournot model is not followed.  
As in duopolies subjects in quadropolies use the adaptive rule to adjust output. Both 
symmetric and asymmetric inexperienced quadropolies use the Cournot best response 
dynamics 24.96% and 46.67% of the time, respectively. With experience, no clear result is 
obtained in terms of the best response dynamics. Similar proportion of symmetric cost 
quadropolies best respond (26.93%) to their rivals, or adjust output in the same direction 
(37.27%). Only a few experienced cost quadropolies best respond, 26.93% for symmetric 
and 20% for asymmetric costs. It seems that best response dynamic is seldom used as the 
environment gets more complicated. It may due to this reason that Rassenti et al. (2000) 
also fail to see subjects use best response as a decision rule. 
5. Conclusions 
We argue that, besides being useful as a valid robustness check, experience may be 
important when it comes to studying strategic play. Our subjects play in the standard 
quantity setting oligopoly twice. Our results replicate earlier known results for 
inexperienced subjects both for duopolies and quadropolies. We find that subjects’ 
experience is important in understanding play in quantity setting oligopolies and find 
important differences in the way experienced subjects play. 
First, we find that experienced duopolies play closer to the collusive outcome. This 
result is supported by the positive Pearson correlation coefficients and the regressions 
results that we obtain. A positive correlation coefficient suggests that subjects best respond 
by changing their output in the same direction as their rivals. Second, although experienced 
quadropolies produce output closer to the Nash-Cournot equilibrium, the Pearson 
correlation coefficient on individual play is positive and statistically significant. This 
suggests that even though the environment is much more competitive firms still try to   27
sustain collusion by adjusting output in the same direction as their rivals, even if the final 
result is not a successful collusion. 
This last result is interesting because until now the competitive nature of markets 
with 4 firms was quite robust. Analysis of individual data, however, tell us that output 
adjustments do not agree with the best response dynamics. The fact that subjects understand 
that collusive outcomes can be attained by adjusting output in the same manner suggests 
that studying the effect of greater level of experience may be a fruitful exercise. 
  In the experiments with moderate cost differences we find that the high cost firm 
produces output well above their non-cooperative prediction. Experienced low cost firms 
play closer to the non-cooperative equilibrium, while experienced high cost firms produce 
output slightly above it. Our experiments with inexperienced duopolies replicate the results 
in Mason et al. (1992). If we only take sales data into account, then an interesting 
implication of the high cost firm deviating more from the non-coopertaive equilibrium is 
that firms may look more similar than they are. Observed outputs thus may not truly reflect 
firm asymmetries when cost differences are not high. Regardless, we observe that cost 
differences are important and both experienced and inexperienced subjects play according 
to the predicted best reponse dynamics. In this sense our results support the assertion made 
in Mason et al. (1992) that firm asymmetry may be a desirable policy goal as it makes the 
inefficient firms much more competitive. Of course, it remains to be seen if our results hold 
in a fixed matching environment and with different degrees of cost asymmetries.
27 
Our experiments also raise several questions. First, with respect to the question 
about to what extent experience does result in collusive outcomes, it will be useful to see 
how do well trained subjects play in this setup. The second issue is regarding random 
matching. It seems that there is a group size effect in the random matching setup. Larger 
groups seem to be more competitive than relatively smaller groups even in the oligopoly 
setup. It may be thus useful to see whether the one shot prediction is obtained when group 
sizes are very large. The group size effect may also have to do with the fact that subjects 
may be playing some supergame in our experiments. That is, small groups may imply that 
                                                 
27 We expect markets to be less competitive in a fixed matching environment.   28
there is greater common knowledge that everyone is playing the same game. This may not 
be the case if group size is large. How group size affects outcomes is an issue for further 
research. Group size seems to be especially relevant in a random matching framework. Our 
results suggest that larger groups are more competitive in average play than smaller groups. 
Another important issue maybe regarding the cost difference that should make a market 
more competitive. From our experimenmts it seems that a combination of group size and 
cost differences affects competition. Whether they re-enforce each other even under 
experience is a further research question.   29
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APPENDIX 
INSTRUCTIONS: for both inexperienced and experienced subjects. 
Introduction: This is a study of decision-making. Funding for this project has been provided by 
public funding agencies. If you follow these instructions, and make decisions carefully, you might 
earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid IN CASH at the end of today's session. 
Important: At any stage you can raise your hand to ask any question relating to the 
experiment. 
Overview: In today's session each of you is a quantity-setting seller in a market. There are TWO 
sellers in each market. The experiment is made up of several weeks. Each week is made up of one 
trading day (called Final Day). You will be randomly and anonymously matched against other 
opponents.  
Trading in Final day proceeds as follows: At the beginning of each day you, as a seller, can offer 
to sell units of a fictitious good. Each good will have a certain unit cost. All sellers have the same 
unit costs. The market price is determined by the sum total of quantity offered by ALL sellers in a 
trading day.  
The price received by sellers is the same for everyone. Example 1 below explains how the price is 
determined. 
Example 1: Let the market demand be P=10-TQ (P = market price, TQ = total quantity offered by 
all sellers). Let us suppose that you offered to sell 2 units. 
Let us also suppose that the number of units offered by the other seller is 3. The total 
quantity (TQ) offered by all sellers then is (3+2=) 5. This implies that the market price,  
P = 10-TQ = 10-5 = 5. 
Note that the price declines as the total quantity offered (TQ) increases. For all TQ greater 
than, or equal to, 10 the market price (P=10-TQ=10-10=0) is zero.  
Further note that the market price can never be negative.   32
 
Example 2 below explains the relationship between the total quantity offered (TQ) and the market 
price (P). 
Example 2: Notice that the market price (P=10-TQ) decreases as the total quantity (TQ) sold in the 
market increases. The table below gives some possible prices for different total quantities (TQ): 
 
Market demand: P=10-TQ
QUANTITY (TQ) PRICE (P)
1 P = 10-1 = 9
2 P = 10-2 = 8
4 P = 10-4 = 6
6 P = 10-6 = 4
7 P = 10-7 = 3
8 P = 10-8 = 2
9 P = 10-9 = 1
10 P = 10-10 = 0
 
 
Procedures for trading are explained in more detail below. 
  1. Sellers earn profits by selling units. The profit for any unit sold is the selling price minus the 
cost of the unit. The selling price will be the same for all units, as will be unit costs. Thus a 
seller’s total profit is; 
Profits = (Selling Price – Unit Cost) × Number of units sold  
  If you offered to sell 2 units at a unit cost of 1/unit, then your total costs would be 2. Then, 
continuing with Example 1 we know that the market price is 5. A seller’s profits will then be, 
Profits = (5-1) × 2 = 4×2 = 8.   33
 
  2. Buyers. The buyers are automated. The price is determined according to the demand in 
Example-1. Given total quantity (TQ), the market price P=10-TQ. In our example TQ=5, this 
implies that P = 10-TQ = 10-5 = 5. 
   
  Note that the same demand will not be used in the experiment. 
There are several important things to understand. 
- The higher (lower) is the total quantity (TQ), the lower (higher) is the price (P)  
(see TABLE in Example 2 above). 
- Your sales are affected by the quantities chosen by the other seller. The higher (lower) is 
the other seller’s quantity lower (higher) is the sales price. The same will be true if you 
increase your quantity and the other seller does not. 
An example, 
(a)  You offered to sell 2 units in Example 1, and the other seller offered 3. If however, the 
other seller would have offered 2, then TQ=4 and the resulting price would be P=6 (see 
TABLE above). Your profits would then be, 
Profits = (6-1) × 2 = 5×2 = 10. 
The trading week: 
a) Each seller can offer to sell some quantity (or none) in the final day. While choosing the quantity 
you should keep in mind that, 
(i) you earn profits only by selling units at a price above Unit Cost and  
(ii) the higher is total quantity, the lower is the sales price (see table above). 
(iii) you earn zero if you sell nothing.   34
  
b) The total quantity offered to sell (TQ) at the end of the final day determines the price. The price 
is determined as explained in Example 1 above. 
Your EARNINGS = (Selling Price – Unit Cost) × Number of units sold.  
How to read the screen and submit your offer? 
On the right side of the screen, there is a history table. A record of all the plays is displayed in the 
table. 
On the left side of the screen, there is a graphical display section.  
You can try different possible combinations of your offer, the sum of all the other sellers offers and 
observe your potential profit on the right side of the display section. 
After you have decided your offer for that day, click the CONFIRM button. NOTE that whenever 
you click the CONFIRM button, you are confirming your offer only. The actual number of units 
offered by other sellers may be different from yours. Also, NOTE that you must click the 
CONFIRM button in order to submit your offer.  
The left side of the graphic display section shows your quantity, the sum of other sellers’ quantity 
and the profit given the price on a particular day.  
4) Overview: 
a) Today’s experiment will consist of a number of weeks. Each trading week consists of only one 
day (called Final day). The final trading week will not be disclosed in advance. 
b) Each of you can choose to offer a quantity for sale in the final day. The final quantity offered for 
sale will be the sum of the quantities (TQ) offered at the end of the final day. This final quantity 
determines the final price (P) you will receive for all the goods. You will be randomly and 
anonymously matched against other opponents.   35
c)  In today’s experiment each one of you will have a Unit Cost of 10 in each period. Each 
participant has identical Unit Costs, and Unit Costs are the same in all trading days. Note, you are 
also informed about the other seller’s Unit Costs in a history table on the Right Side of the screen. 
 
d) You will be paid $0.18 U.S. for every 1000 “experimental dollars” you earn in the market. Thus, 
for example, every 5555.56 experimental dollars equals $1. Your total earnings for today’s 
experiment will be the sum of your earnings in the experiment, plus your $20 (U.S.) appearance fee 
(paid together with the earnings of the next experiment).  
e)  Some participants may make their quantity decisions earlier than others. If you make your 
quantity decision before other sellers, please wait quietly while others finish. The monitor will make 
sure that there are no unnecessary delays. 
f) Please note that, talking with, or looking at, other participants is not allowed. The market will be 
closed and all participants will be asked to leave without further payment if any participant 
communicates in any way other than the manner described in these instructions. 
g) At the end of the experiment you will be called out and your earning will be paid to you in cash. 
You will now practice before you start the experiment. You can practice up to 5 weeks. Please click 
on “Ready to Practice” if you fully understand the instruction. 